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skills we could gratefully learn.
We liter
ally have "alien" life and a presentimmt of
consciousness right at our feet and all a
round us in every environment that humankind
itself has o:::me to live in, and BaDe that are
as yet uninhabitable for us.
Animal life
fran insects to higher mantnals abounds on our
planet, though in nearly every respect it is
threatened by human maladaptation to the
enviroI1l'OOllt and our lack of mrlerstan:li.ng of
its fragile interrelationships.
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When NASA launched its recent series of
Voyager spacecraft on multi-year journeys to
the outer planets of our solar system, jour
neys that will take them beyond our solar
system to destinations we know not where, the
space agency included on each Voyager a cap
sule containing artifacts designed to camn.m
icate with alien beings.
The artifacts were
designed first to explain our location in the
Milky Way galaxy, our fhysiogncmy, our cul
tural institutions and symbols, and certain
rudiments of a possible mathematical language
of camn.mication.
Presumably, any alien be
ings that might chance upon these spacecraft
'NOUld be able to decifher the meaning of the
contents, and if they are logical, benign,
and intelligent beings, they will seek to
comrmmicate with us and relieve us of our
. sense of· isolation as possibly the only in
telligent beings in the universe.

Until recently there have been pitifully
few attempts by humans to ccmnunicate with
and "learn the wisdan of" our fellow beings
an Earth. But is it possible for us to learn
the "language" and the true capacities of
other animals?
Do animals have intelligence
at all?
'!he answers to these questions are
vital to our ability to live an and manage
this planet.
And they are vital to us if we
are ever really to understand our own capaci
ties, as well.

It is almost impossible to imagine what
the tremendous impact on human history 'NOUld
be if we were to receive a return manuscript
in a bottle, so to speak, or sane other
manifestation of an answer to our hopes and
inquiries.
Humans are not alone in the uni
verse! There are other intelligent, sentient
beings in the universe who could, perhaps,
give us their wisdan and their perspective to
break through the terrible and seemingly
insoluble problems that we face. And perhaps
best of all, we might fin:i sane way to return
to tlle harnDnious and natural state of living
that eludes us in our Imlch synthesized world.

Evolution and Ca1sciousness
Long before Olarles Darwin developed the
scientific theory of biological evolution and
twentieth century astrofhysicists developed a
theory for the evolution of planets, stars,
and galaxies, the fhilosofhers of Irxtia p.1t
forth a concept of evolution that remarkably
parallels our m:dern scientific theories.
Stories of creation and evolution found ;in
the ancient H.iJiiu scriptures, the Upmishads,
sane three thousand years old, tell of a kind
of consciousness that pervades all of crea
tion.
'!his consciousness they called "At

But sane would ask why we nust search
the
far reaches of the universe for a
consciousness different fran our own, when we
live on a planet that presents us with a
~erful multiplicity of life, vibrant with
species that we know virtually nothing about,
and fran whose intelligence and adaptive
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toire of res~ses having been passed on fran
generation to generation, changing only as
enviromnental needs dictate.

man," which, aware only of itself, began with
the rrost basic o:xnpourrls, such as rocks and
minerals, and through a process of successive
o:mplexity and ccmbination of
rrolecules,
crossed the threshold fran inorganic to 0r
ganic matter. And again through a process of
ocxnbination, canplexity, and "karmic" exper
ience (learning) , which the Hindus called
"reincarnation" or rebirth after the perish
ing of the previous temporal fonn, CXJllScious
ness noved up the ladder of creation fran
plant, to insect, to vertebrate, and through
the phyla and classes of vertebrates, finally
t..o arrive at the cra.ming achievement of
creation-humanity.
Humanity itself is con
tinually in the process of refinement throuqh
this sare law of reincarnation.
At each
stage of this progression all that has been
gathered fran previous stages remains as a
Part of the newly c:xxrplex being; nothing is
lost; rather, each new stage accrues new
material for its life process while keeping
vestiges of the old.

At the other extrema, philosophers \>tho
have folla.led on the path laid out by Des
cartes see the mind as sanething that is
intangible,
inaccessible, and, certainly,
mysterious in its capabilities.
All of the
mind's activities are based on the axis of
reality--thooght itself.
Taken to its ex
treme, external reality is not even a proven
fact, and the organism is trapped within the
walled city of the mind.
HCMever, in the latter Part of the twen
tieth century, IlDst philosophers and scien
tists, inclu:ling those who study artificial
intelligence (the science of cybernetics) ,
are willing to postulate the existence of
sane fODll of "consciousness" and are not
afraid to lex>k for it in the study of animal
and human behavior and the intricacies of
neurophysiology.
One thing they do agree
on-the rrore o:mplex the organism, the great
er its capacity and diversity of nental
states.
'lhat is, the o:mplexityof mental
experience and awareness seems to correlate
directly with the canplexity and structure of
the brain which sits at the center of the
body' s neurological system.

When we CXJllSider the miracle of life-
that is, that raw matter has becane animate
and sensate through the fifteen billion years
of the universe' s existence, that the whole
of our existence has becane so much rrore than
the sum of our rrolecular Parts-it is not
hard to feel the profound awe that the an
cients felt for creation. Looking about them
and seeing the vast array of plant and animal
life, each with its own niche and set of
behaviors, and also seeing that hmnans pos
sessed many of the traits of other animals,
the ancients set down their metaphysical rule
of evolution.
we continue to this day to
grapple with our understanding of all that
carne to pass. I>bst perplexing of all, at the
center of this miracle of life lies its
greatest achievemmt,
and,
perhaps, its
greatest problem,
as well--consciousness.
What is it?
How does it manifest itself?
And for our purposes, do animals have it,
and, i f so, how is it different fran our
hunan CXJllSciousness?

Most scientists would directly link an
organism's "nental states" to the capacity of
its brain, and the ratio of its brain size
to body mass.
Another yardstick for measur
ing awareness is behavior-how an organism' s
experiences and sensations are processed and
channeled back into sane fonn of activity.
Even here, there may be seeming contradic
tions to the rule correlating brain canplexi
ty with behavior \>then one canpares the ener
getic social organization of ants and bees
wi th the seeming indolence of a ma:amalian
tree sloth.
Their body structures are radi
cally different:
the insects have scarcely
any brain at all, while the sloth, though a
lCMer order maIIIllal, has an incanparably IlOre
canplex nervous system and brain.
These
widely different animals have, nevertheless,
many activities in
i.e., they inter
act with their respective enviromnents, and
they share qualities of loccm::>tion, foraging,
sexual reproduction, etc., with other ani
mals. So, we must ask: What is the signifi
cance' of the difference in their biology,
coupled with the similarity of many of their
activities?

.

'lb answer these questions, we must first
cane up with an operative definition of what
consciousness is. The definition we use must
have a satisfactory scientific and phenem:mo
logical foundation.
The problem, of aJUrse,
is that definitions have varied fran one
school to another, each defending its own
narrowly selected criteria.
Behaviorists
deny that there is anything like conscious
ness ~~. Rather, there are merely stimu
l i that elicit learned responses--the reper

ex:rmron,

Charles Darwin laid a foundation for our
2,9
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comparison of species and classes of animals.
Using the general theme of natural selection
and differentiation of species derivEd fran a
corrrcon ancestor, Darwin p:>ints out that there
are vestigial and rudimentary organs and sys
tems common to many different taxa:

sagan then makes an intriguing analogy.
The genetic encoding that is carried through
the DNA in chromosomes can be ccmpared with
all other fonns of information and broken
into canponent pieces.
Since, as sagan
p:>ints out, there are four different nucleo
tides in each DNA roolecule, and in a single
hUflWl chromosome there are five billion sets
of nucleotides, we suddenly arrive at the
fact that there are twenty billion bits of
information in a single hUflWl chramosame. If
this were to be comparEd with the binary bits
of information in a canputer, sagan makes the
astounding p:>int that a single hUflWl chramo
some carries the same information as a four
thousand voltnne library, with each volume
containing five hundrEd pages and each page
three hundred words.

The homological construction
of the whole frame [of the body] in
the nenbers of the same class is
intelligible
if we admit their
descent fran a camon progenitor,
together with their subsequent a
daptation to diversifiEd
condi
tions.
• With respect to de
velopnent, we can clearly tm<ler
stand on the principle of varia
tions supervening at a rather late
embryonic period, and being inher
itEd at a corresp:>nding period, hc1w
it is that the embryos of wonder
fully different fonns should still
retain roore or less perfectly, the
structure of the CCIIIlInIl progenitor.
In o:rder to tm<lerstand the
existence of rudimentary organs, we
have only to suppose that a progen
itor p:>ssessEd the parts in ques
tion in a perfect state and that
under changEd habits of life they
became greatly rEducEd either fran
simply disuse or through the natur
al selection of the individuals
which were least enCl.UIlberEd by a
superfluous part.[l]
Carl sagan, a notEd astroIiJ.ysicist, was
one of the designers of the capsules in the
Voyager spacecraft mentionEd above.
In his
book, The Dragons of Ffien, sagan has upjated
the observations of Darwin with a discussion
of the genetics of evolutionary developnent:

The genetic instructions of the DNA
molecule, which are randomly mutatEd by envi
ronmental factors, allow for either success
ful or unsuccessful adaptation of the organ
ism to its envirornnent.
But as organisms
became roore canplex and as the IiJ.ysical envi
ronment becaIre subject to quicker cycles of
transformation and uIiJ.eaval, as during ice
ages, the chances for a successful, purely
genetic transformation to meet the new condi
tions became roore problematic.
For these
larger, roore O3lI.Plex organisms, sane new
system of survival and adaptive information
needEd to be developed, and that, according
to sagan, was the extragenetic growth and
specialization of the nervous system. Randan
genetic transformation of the organism had
reachEd its practical limits for success (for
every success, thousands of failures would
occur) 1 henceforth, information relevant to
survival and propagation, and the enhancEd
sensory systems to convey new information,
would be processEd in the brain.

The book of life is very rich; a
typical chroroosanal DNA roolecule in
a hUflWl is canposEd of about five
billion pairs of nucieotides.
The
genetic instructions of all other
taxa [a biological division
of
species, classes, etc., e.g., plant
vs. animal] on earth are written in
the same language, with the same
code book.
Indeed. this sharEd
genetic language is one line of
evidence that all the organisms on
Earth are descendEd fran a single
ancestor, a single instance of the
origin of life sane four billion
years ago. (p. 2.3)

The brain as we know it today, with its
recognizable divisions, had already evolved
sane five hundrEd million years ago.
It
continued to grow and specialize as life
fonns changEd fran marine to amphibian to
reptilian and, finally, to manmalian.
At
each of these stages, species have developed
which have made optimum use of their brains
within the taxa limits. The roore intelligent
of these animals have had larger brains to
run their bodies.
The fact that there is
excess brain capacity over and above that
which is needEd for simple biological main
tenance is often seen as an indication of
p:>tential intelligence.
In roodern times,
chimpanzees, dolprlns, whales, and hUflWlS
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cold, etc.
It is here also that the direc
tions imparted to the lOOtor system (nerves
that activate the heart, lungs, muscles, and
other organs) proceed directly into the cen
tral nervous system.

have the largest brain size to body mass
ratios am are at the top of the :marrmalian
intelligence scale.
Cile scientist who has worked on identi
fying the layered growth of animal brains
over the course of evolution is Paul D. Mac
lean, head of the Laboratory for Brain Evolu
tion and Behavior at the National Institute
of Mental Health. Elaborating on the work of
James Papez, Maclean has defined and explored
three different parts of the brains of lOOst
animal species.
In his work, as in lOOst
other scientific studies, the yardstick for
measuring brain capabilities is usually the
human brain. This bas sane obvious drawbacks
as far as the question of animal conscious
ness is concerned; for, aIlOng other reasons,
when they are experimentally mmip.1lated,
animals cannot "report" their sensations and
feelings as a hum:m can.
Nevertheless, the
underlying neuroIilysiology shows sane inter
esting similarities between animals and hu

'!he
"psychological"
and
behavioral
states that characterize this part of the
brain seem to involve ritualistic am hierar
chical displays, such as the spectra of dani.
nance-sul:mission, sexual courtship, display,
mass migration, and ganging up on the weak.
'I'here is a certain "stolidness," to use sa
gan I s tenn, about creatures, such as rep
tiles, that have this as the daninant part of
their brain.
Yet, the efficiency and neces
si ty of this part of the brain in organisms
is amply attested by the incredibly long
period that reptiles have lived on Earth. No
organism, least of all humans, with their
elaborate, specialized brain, could exist, i f
it were not for the vital functions perfonned
by this part of the brain.

mans.
2.

Maclean has studied. a number of species
and found that there is an older brain which
he calls the reptilian ccxnplex, because it
was the major brain for reptiles. going back
to the age of the dinosaurs.
The midbrain,
also called the limbic system, surrounds the
reptilian ccmplex.
Finally, the forebrain,
or neocortex, developed its pr:i.ma.cy after the
other two and usually sits atop or surrounds
them. Maclean emphasizes this in the follow
ing dramatic way:

'I'he limbic system of the brain, sane
times called the midbrain, is usually associ
ated with older or less intelligent marrmals,
such as horses, marsupials, sloths, etc.,
because it is the chief feature of their
brains.
It, of course, exists in ·sane fonn
in species fran fish to humans. It is called
the limbic system because it is associated
with the functioning of the limbs of the body
and the refinement of their uses.

Speaking allegorically, we might
illIagine that when a psychiatrist
bids the patient lie on the couch,
he is asking him to stretch out
alongside a horse and a croco
dile. [2]

I t is a nore .I;XJWerful part of the brain,
in the sense that a ccmp.lter with nr:>re capa
city and greater speed is considered nr:>re
powerful.
Psychologically, it afI)ears to be
the center of strong em:>tions,
such as
rage/fear, pleasure/pain, and rejoicing/sor
rowing. The limbic system's ablity to affect
our body with the release of strong endocrine
chemicals is often reflected in our speech,
as when we refer to our em:>tions with IiJ.rases
like "love in our hearts" and "anguish in our
guts," or when primitive societies locate a
"dem::m" in the liver, 1xJwels, etc. sane of
the behaviors which are said· to be controlled
by this part of the brain are flight/fight,
tension/relaxation, hunting, hoarding, ag
gression, bonding, searching, flocking, and
rejoicing.

Since the three divisions of the brain are
fouOO in all kinds of an:i.ma.ls, fran the lOOst
primitive to the lOOst ccmplex, we must take a
nore detailed look at their functions.

1.

'!he Reptilian Brain

'!he reptilian brain,

or hiOO brain,

'!he Limbic System

is

the lOOst basic part of the upper nervous
system. it is often referred to as the brain
stem, which feeds directly into the central
nervous system at its lower ern.
It is here
that the brain begins to process the inp.xt of
the sensory systems of the body-touch, heat,

Carl sagan bas noted the following about
the evolution of the limbic system:
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have had scme alteration or surgical stimula
tion of the cortical areas of the brain.

There are reasons to think that the
beginnings of altruistic behavior
are in the limbic system.
Irrleed,
with rare exceptions (chiefly the
social insects), manmals and birds
are the only organisms to devote
substantial attention to the care
of
their YOlIDg--an evolutionary
developnent that, through the long
period of plasticity which it per
mits, takes advantage of the large
information processing capability
of
the
mamnalian and primate
brains.
Love seans to be the in
vention of the mamnals.

The subtlety of the functions of the
neocortex argues not only for its :iJnpJrtance
to the conscious activi ty of the human being
but also brings us to the precise heart of
our difficulties in assessing the conscious
ness of animals.
AIthough we can observe a
loss of hearing or sight in an animal, it is
IOOre difficult to see just what effects other
manipulations in the cortical areas of ani
mali; \',Quld have on their flIDctioning.. They
cannot report to us their sensations, or if
they have tried to report their sensations,
we have not learned the language of even one
species other than our own. It reminds us of
Bishop Berkeley I s argument that i f a tree
falls in a forest and no one is there to hear
it fall, does it really wake a sound?
This
will have a bearing on our discussion of
animal behavior below.

sagan i.nmediately qualifies this statement to
include nan-mamnals with lesser developed
limbic systems:
This rule on the relative parental
concern of mamnals and reptiles is,
however, by no means without excep
tion. Nile crocodile IOOthers care
fUlly put their fresh hatchlings in
their IlDUthS and carefully carry
them to the canparative safety of
the river waters; while 3arengeti
male lions will, upon newly doni
nating the pride, destroy all the
resident cubs.[3]

As we have already noted, the neocortex
is the IOOst recent evolutionary developnent
of the neurological system in animals.
It
ranges fran being a very small adjunct to the
brain in fish and snakes to CCil!POsing nearly
half the brain in sane mamnals, while in its
IOOst advanced evolution in humans, it cx:.m
poses up to 70% of all neurons in the central
nervous system.

this I 'ItUuld add the poignant wait of the
IOOther sea turtle, after journeying perhaps
thousands of miles, at the edge of the surf
for those of her hatchlings who can wake it
to the safety of the water on the day after
they hatch.
This scene probably stretches
back tens of millions of years to the priIOOr
dial age of the reptile. Still, there can be
no doubt that the limbic system represents a
great evolutionary advance toward the broad
ening of "mental" capability and behavior
over the IOOre primitive reptilian cx:mplex.
To

3.

Structurally in humans, the neocortex
has a number of interesting divisions, the
IOOst :iJnpJrtant being a left/right hernisJ;here
split.
The left hernisJ;here, once thought to
be the daninant half of the brain, because,
anong other things, it OJIltrols right-handed
ness in humans, is apparently the_ side that
controls linguistic and mathematical ability.
However, in rrost well-developed brains with
an excess cap3.city beyond simple biological
maintenance, there is OJIlsiderable redundan
cy, with backup areas of the brain capable of
picking up sane functions lost when damage
occurs to other parts of the brain.
The
right side of the neocortex is devoted to the
aptitude for IlDJSic, identification of visual
p3.tterns and the expression and reoognibon
of enntians.
'lbese are thought to be €!lOC)"
bans that are developed in the various lim
bic parts of the brain but are recognized and
expressed by the necessary help of the right
side of the neocortex.

The Neocortex

The neocortex is the last and IOOSt revo
lutionary addition to the brain.
With the
neocortex, or forebrain, we IlkJVe fran the
clearly delineated biological and behavioral
functions of the reptilian and limbic systans
to a IOOre subtle and less well-defined set of
functions
and behaviors.
Because human
beings have by far the best developed neocor
tex, it is not surprising that the preponder
ance of our data on this part of the brain
canes fran studies made on human p3.tients who
BETWEEN THE SPECIES

Norman Geschw:ind, writing in SCientific
American, notes that we know of "haoologous
areas that are found in all species that have
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a well-developed cerebral cortex."[4]
Pre
sumably, other species with less well-<ievel
oped cortices could have other areas of their
brains that are used for similar functions.
Geschwind notes the results of experiments on
rhesus nnnkeys who had occipital lobes exper
imentally manipulated, which had a direct
effect on the nnnkeys' ability to recognize
faces. 'lbe nnnkeys were shown fhotDgraphs of
other nnnkeys and could readily identify
them, but they lost this ability when areas
of the occipital lobes were cut. 'Ibis abili
ty to recngnize individuals is a "valuable
talent in a highly social animal and there
has probably been strong selective pressure
to improve its efficiency.n[S] Another re
markable example of an animal' s ability to
select stirmlli and recognize a specific fea
ture· is that of the tern, a sea bird.
'lbe
IlDther leaves her chick in the bird colony of
tens of thousands of birds to catch fish, and
upon her return, she can recognize the exact
squawk of her chick out of the deafening
cacoJ;hony of thousands of chicks and adults
in the colony.

flows of the Arctic.

4.

Artificial Intelligence

Whether it is a measure of human soli{r
sism or whether it is sane brave new fonn of
Pranethean endeavor, ~ sapiens is the only
species to attempt to duplicate its own in
telligence.
We have, indeed, gone beyond
mere storage and retrieval of our extrasana
tic infonnation (books, libraries, tapes,
films, etc. ) when we attempt to create our
own thinking machines.
The very recent and
still fonning convergence of llDdern };hilo
soJ;hy of the mind, neuroJ;hysiology, and the
science of cybernetics has focused the debate
over intelligence on the search for artifi
cial intelligence.
If it is. possible to
reduce consciousness and intelligence to an
electrical ""1lIeChani.cal set of programs and
equations that would rival the working of the
brain, we could do away forever with carte
sian dualism and simply work on a greater
and greater aggregate of infonnation proces
sing.
We could then nnve through the scale
of J;hylo-intelligence until we arrived at the
duplication of human intelligence.
We could
"reconcile
synapses with souls. II
James
Gleick asks, "can machines be taught the most
human of human traits-creativity, inspira
tion, imagination?n[6]

Behaviorists and ethologists who share
their views would argue that this is not an
example of consciousness. It is, supposedly,
a simple sti.rmJlus and response.
But since
they deny consciousness to humans as well,
for the purposes of this paper, we can brac
ket this };hilosoJ;hical question and assert
that what is significant is that animals as
diverse as terns and rhesus nonkeys exhibit
qualities of attentiveness and behavior that
closely resemble those of humans and in many
instances nay have rrore acute senses than we
do.
'lbere can be no doubt that the human
neocortex is not only larger in its mass to
body weight ratio than other animals but is
also IlDre anatanically canplex. Still, there
does not appear to be a clear-cut division
between Hem:> sapiens and the rest of the
animal kingdan (especially higher order ani
nals) with regard to the capabilities of the
nervous system.
Rather, it is a question of

Gleick's article focuses on the work of
Douglas Hofstadter, author of Godel, Escher,
Bach, in his efforts to recreate the subtle
ties of the human thought process.
The key
ingredients, according to Hofstadter, are:
Perception.
Mem::>ry. Analogy. Re
grouping.
Abilities to do
very simple things, to take things
apart and put them back together
again in new ways, {are] so much at
the root of creativity.
when a
canposer like Bach canposed fugues,
you can practically see the wheels
churning.
You can see Bach taking
things apart and putting them back
together-you can see that incredi
ble fluidity.n[?]

the greater number of skills and responses as
well as a question of their a:mplexity and
abstraction that seems to set animals apart
fran humans.
It is the way that humans can,
on a very subtle level, canbine features of
consciousness by creatively associating ima
ges and meIlDries to fom entirely new sets of
thoughts that is missing in animals who must
adapt to a narrower set of environmental
factors.
After all, the human species, un
like any other animal, can adapt to habitats
as diverse as the Kalihari desert and the ice

Hofstadter's \OiOrk is controversial, because
every cybernetic scientist would admit that
an intuitive, surprising, and often irration
al human being could hopelessly outflank. even
the II¥JSt formidable ccmpxter, as depicted in
Arthur C. Clarke' s n2001--A Space OOyssey. n
It is a question of the perception, meIlDry,
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explicable
behavior patterns?
Donald R.
Griffin, in his book The Question of Animal
Awareness, provides us with an admittedly
"unso];histicated but useful set of working
definitions for states of awareness:"

analogy, and regrouping abilities of the
brain that seemingly could never be dupli
catedl although, according to Gleick, there
has been much progress m3de toward JlI?lk.ing the
canpIter a IlPre subtie instrument.
Hofstad
ter does not use the typical problem-solving
approach which asks the grand question and
then works through· processes until the minu
tiae are solved.
Rather, Hofstadter starts
with the minutiae, that asp:ct of the Problem
which has only the IlPSt Peri];heral CXJIUlection
with the larger Problem he is solving, and by
canbining, associating, and regrouping the
data, he attempts to arrive at a process that
reseobles the workings of the human mind.

Mental Awareness:
every normal
Person thinks about objects and
events that are rem:>te in time and
space fran the i.Imled.iate flux of
sensations.
Awareness:
is the whole set of
interrelated mental images of the
flow of events 1 they may be close
at hand in time and space like a
toothache or raoote as in an astro
ncmer's concept of stellar evolu
tion.
An Intention:
involves mental i
mages of events in which the in
tender pictures himself as a parti
ciPant and makes a choice as to
which image he will bring to reali
ty.[9]

But it is also clear that animals share
these same abilities of Perception, IIIe1rory,
analogy, and regrouping. Hofstadter and his
colleagues would do well to take a closer
look at the abilities of animals before they
tackle human intelligence.
Gleick quotes
Professor Marvin Minsky of M.I.T., who is
both a supporter and a critic of Hofstadter' s
work:

Combining these features, Griffin then
formulates a working definition:
"'!he pre
sence of mental images and their use by an
animal to regulate its behavior Provide a
pragmatic definition of consciousness." [lO]
Mental experiences involve not just the im
mediate flow of sensations to the brain's
sensory canplex but also their filtering
through the lens of IIIe1rory and association.
As a result, mental images IIPVe fran the
passive realm to the active when an organism
denonstrates intentionality.
Intentionality
here is seen in both its P1enanenological
sense-that of an organism's consciousness
apprehending the external world-and also in
the sense that an organism "intends" actions
that Project into the future.
To illustrate
a rapid fire process of mental experiences
and intentionality, we will take the example
of a fox chasing a rabbit.
'!he fox senses
that the rabbit is real and is food.
As it
IlPVes over the terrain, the fox must intend
to act en its environment by leaping boul
ders, changing course, and, perhaps, by anti
cipating the IlPVeltleI1ts of its prey.
The raw
sensory data (mental experiences) cc.mbine
with mental images of measurement and IlPtien
and food, etc., to elicit choices for new
IlOVelIe1ts which fonn a rapid and continuous
stream of events.

Nobody's ever tried to make a ma
chine that could build a bird' s
nest.
Instead they're all out
there in the factories asseobling
IlPtors.
People say, oh yes, the
bird gets straws and sticks them in
a nest and glues them in.
But a
IlPtor is designed to be put toge
ther.
The debris lying around on
the forest floor ian't designed to
be made into nests. [8]
'!hus, the ability of a bird to take
things that have CXJIUlection to one another
and rem:>ve and reassemble them into a struc
ture that has coherence and function is sane
thing that no machine has been able to a
chieve.
The processes are creative and sub
tie.
'!he African lowland gorilla, likewise,
will build a new nest in the trees everyday
out of forest matter while on his foraging
rounds in the jungle. And an otter will grab
a rock off the sea floor to break open an
abalone shell, so that he may ccmnence his
feast.

Animal Consciousness

If there are similar, harologous struc
tures in evolutionary developnent and neuro
logical functioning could we not postulate
similarities in "mental states" based on
BEIWEEN THE SPOCIFS

In addi tien to demJIlStrating the process
of intentionality, which is a fundamental
characteristic of consciousness, one can also
34

may

note the presence of other sensations in this
scenario--hunger for the fox, fear for the
rabbit, and, possibly, desperation for both
of them.
These animals, by their behavior,
dennnstrate sensations that we can observe
and measure (endocrine releases and other
physiological events).
And by the fact that
humans experience hanologous events and reac
tions, we can equate the animals' sensations
to our own sensations of pain, fear, hunger,
etc.

forage up to three miles fran the

hive,

and the bee's sense of distance and direction
as it forages is probably derived fran the
location of the sun, plus its sense of land

marks on its journeys. other bees will dance
and camnmi.cate information about their own
journeys, and there will be a little canpari
son shopping before m:>re bees are dispatched
to the !lOst premising food sources.
'!hese and other examples of animal beha

vior are used by Griffin to refute the argu
Ccmnunication is an important element of
consciouSness.
Two important forms of can
numication are ccmnuni.cation with the envi
ronment and ccmnun.ication between members of
the same species.
As an example of the for
mer, Griffin cites the case of certain spe
cies of birds who apparently are able to use
the magnetic alignment of the earth and star
p3.tterns to aid them in their migrations. He
also discusses the activities of echolocating
bats that use echoes to negotiate the canplex
labyrinths of tmderground caves.
Both of
these examples suggest that these species
must have a changing awareness of their envi
rorunent
and must redirect their behavior as
new information becanes available.
In the
case of the echolocating bats, which Griffin
nicknames "Andrea Doria bats," he cites data
showing that the bats will meroorize their
environment and often pay only cursory atten
tion as they fly through the caves.
If new
objects are put in the cave, the bats will
often collide with them (hence "Andrea Dor
ia, II a ship that collided with another one
despite the presence of radar).
This dEm:)Il
strates that they were flying by I1BOC)ry and
did not expect the new objects.

ments of linguists, such as Noam Chansky, and
ethologists, such as Konrad Lorenz, that the
difference between humans and animals can be
seen in the former's use of language.
Chan
sky and others postulate sixteen design fea
tures of human camnmi.cation that differ fran
those of animals.
But upon closer examina
tion, Griffin suggests, these
are widely
shared by animals, as well, or
there is
no clear evidence that they are actually
unique to humans.
These include vocal-aUl'li
tory exchange, interchangeability (animals
can be both transmitters and receivers),
specialization (energy in the signal is small
canpared to the effect triggered by it),
arbitrariness (how rigidly reproduced are the
signals and their information content), dis
creteness (hC7;f discrete are the individual
units of camnmi.cation, i.e., words or syl
lables versus the single cycle of the honey
bee waggle dance), etc.
In every case. the distinction between
the supposedly unique characteristic of human
camnmication and the animal camnmication
blurs and becanes altzost meaningless. Final
ly, Griffin quotes Alfred North Whitehead:

As for the case of animals carmunicating
with others of their own species or IOOlllbers
of other species, Griffin cites the impres
sive \«)Xk of Jane Goodall and the Gardners in
teaching chiropanzees the rudiments of sign
language and facial expressions.
f.t)st amaz
ing of all is his discussion of the research
of Karl von Frisch on honeybee dancing as a
fonn of ccmnuni.cation. Beginning in 1923 and
extending for the next five decades, von
. Frisch stUl'lied the "waggle dances" of honey
bees.
He learned that bees returning to the
hive fran their foraging afield do a type of
dance to camnmicate to other bees vital
information about food sources, their abun
dance, their direction and distance fran the
hive, and even information to the effect that
they may have found a better place for the
hive to locate in the event of a swarm. Bees

The distinction between man and
animal is in one sense only a dif
ference in degree.
But the extent
of the degree makes all the differ
ence.
The Rubicon has been cros
sed. [11]
'!hat is, animals share all or IOOSt of the
distinguishing characteristics of human lan
guage and camnmication which are the marks
of consciousness.
'!he main difference seems
to be the quantitative degree and breadth of
human language which is what really distin
guishes our species fran others.
Yet there
can be no doubt that the sum of these quanti
tative differences leaves a great gulf be
tween humans and lIDst other animal species.
'!he intriguing exception to this rule may be
dolpuns and whales, who have brain size to
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Qle can only wonder if, upon the arrival
of Sagan's sought after extraterrestrials,
whether we as humans would be so overlooked
and disregarded.
WOuld they be as insensi
tive? can we learn this lesson nCltf?

body mass ratios canparable to our own.
Dr.
John Lilly has pioneered in the study of the
intricate language patterns of many of these
species, especially the bottle nose dolphins.
He remains convinced that they are every bit
as intelligent as humans, an:! considerably
rrore benign, as well.

Conclusion
'lbe work of behaviorists, linguists, an:!
ethologists has failed to define any quality
that humans possess that is not also pos
sessed to some degree in other animals, es
pecially the higher mamnals. 'lbe subtle bias
of these scientists has been to reduce the
status of humans to the level of other ani
mals which are seen as mere stimulus/response
machines. But Donald Griffin argues, and the
data can certainly support the idea, that we
should, instead, see animals as beings that
are Imlch rrore kindred to ourselves. To para
phrase Whitehead, our abilities seem to be
those of degree and not of kirrl.
We have
Imlch rrore in camon with animals than our
previous chauvinistic history would reflect.
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